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The Evolution of Common Law: Revisiting Posner, Hayek & the Economic 
Analysis of Law 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper is aimed at highlighting how common law has evolved over the centuries, namely through                
the flexibility accorded to judicial precedents, as well as through the evolutionary nature evidenced in               
the processes and rules applied in statutory interpretation. In addition to illustrating how informational              
asymmetries can be mitigated through decentralisation, the paper also illustrates how a particular case,              
Pepper v Hart has revolutionised the scope and permissibility of aids to statutory interpretation.              
Whilst the decision in the case has been criticised as having facilitated a transfer of powers from the                  
executive and legislature, to the judiciary, it is also evident that any form of aid to statutory                 
interpretation - which would greatly assist judges in arriving at reasonable outcomes - in terms of                
legitimate expectations and efficient allocation of economic resources, should be permitted in judicial             
proceedings.  
 
Whilst financial markets and changes in the environment impact legislators, and whilst it is widely               
accepted that legislation constitutes the supreme form of law, the necessity for judges to introduce a                
certain level of flexibility will also contribute towards ensuring that legitimate expectations of involved              
parties are achieved - particularly where the construction of the words within a statute gives rise to                 
considerable ambiguity.  
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The Evolution of Common Law: Revisiting Posner, Hayek & the Economic 
Analysis of Law 
 
Marianne Ojo  1
 
 
 
A Introduction 
 
To Be or Not to Be Regulated: Purposive Rules and the Centralisation of Information 
 
Posner’s conception of law as “a series of disparate rules, and as purposive”  2
 
The development of judicial precedents and the role of judges in the interpretation of statutes and                
legislation - to better align with the original intent of the legislator, has been evidenced over the past                  
centuries. Certain cases, however, have reflected possibilities whereby judicial development may           
generate outcomes which are contrary to legislative intent. This can be illustrated by section 10 (b) and                 
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which has been highlighted as having been                
interpreted “to require corporate insiders and tippees to either disclose material inside information or              
refrain from trading.”  3
 
Carlton and Fischel argue that such judicial development is contrary to legislative intent and that no                
evidence exists to support the fact that Congress intended to prohibit insider trading.  4
 
Further, whereas Hayek is considered to view the common law as a “spontaneous order which               
regulates society better than a person could”, Posner is considered to view the law as “an order                 
consciously made through the efforts of judges and legislators.”  5
1  Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Administration, North-West University, South Africa  
 Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com 
2 TJ Zywicki and AB Sanders, “Posner, Hayek & the Economic Analysis of Law” Iowa Law Review Volume 93 No                    
2,pp 559-603 February 2008, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, see particularly               
abstract 
3 SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir 1968) (en banc), cert denied, 404 U.S 1005 (1971). See D Carlton                        
and D Fischel, “The Regulation of Insider Trading” Stanford Law Review Volume 35 No 5 (May 1983) pp 857-895 at                    
page 884, 
4 see ibid 
5 see TJ Zywicki and AB Sanders, “Posner, Hayek & the Economic Analysis of Law” Iowa Law Review Volume 93 No                     
2,pp 559-603 February 2008, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, see particularly               
abstract 
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Such above differing views about levels of control of the law and perceptions of being regulated and the                  
ability to regulate, can be attributed as influential factors in the opinions also shared by Posner and                 
Hayek on the roles of judges, as well as their support for decentralisation (Hayek) and centralisation                
(Posner) of information. The question revolving around why firms might want to allocate “property rights               
in valuable information” to managers, rather than to shareholders, is not merely based on the premises                6
that managers may value such information more than shareholders, but also attributed to the ability of                
such agents to better monitor, supervise and account for the distribution and dissipation of such               
information in a manner and timing (which shareholders are less better equipped and specialised to               
handle). 
 
From this perspective, it could be argued that whilst information regulates those who are less specialised                
and equipped to handle such information, the delegation and centralisation of such information to those               
who are better specialised and equipped to handle such priceless resources and privileged public              
utilities, generates an outcome whereby such information is better regulated, as well as maximised. 
 
In like manner, whilst law, and in particular the common law, could regulate those who are less                 
specialised to handle such rules, they are regulated by more capable individuals and authorities. Hence               
the question does not necessarily and merely relate to whether law is being regulated or regulates, but                 
rather, why it should be regulated and the agents through which such regulation should take place. 
 
In their article, Carlton and Fischel, also argue that “even if Federal regulation is justified on the basis of                   
law enforcement cost, firms should have the opportunity to opt out of the regulation in the absence of                  
any showing of third party effects, and that such firms are best judges of how to structure the terms of                    
their employment contracts.”   7
 
Therein lies the argument for enforced self regulation. Whilst individual firms may be the best judges to                 
decide on the design of their contracts, in order for those contracts to be tailor made to adjust better to                    
their firm’s needs, self regulation through these firms, may be better enforced by the State and through                 
the courts. Even with its advantages, certain disadvantages can also be attributed to self-regulation . As               8
well as being consequential of a lack of transparency in a regulatory and supervisory regime, regulatory                
capture is also more likely to occur where a system of self regulation exists.  
6 See See D Carlton and D Fischel, “The Regulation of Insider Trading” Stanford Law Review Volume 35 No 5 (May 
1983 at page 866 
7 see ibid at page 895 
8 For further information on the advantages and disadvantages of Self Regulation, Enforced Self Regulation see M 
Ojo, “Co-operative and Competitive Enforced Self Regulation: The Role of Governments, Private Actors and Banks in 
Corporate Responsibility http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27850/1/MPRA_paper_27850.pdf; also see I Ayres and J 
Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford University Press at page 102 
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Posner and Theories of Economic Regulation 
 
The theory of regulatory capture was introduced by Richard Posner who argued that „regulation is not                
about the public interest at all, but is a process, by which interest groups seek to promote their private                   
interest..”   9
 
 
- The economic theory of regulation as proposed by Stigler admits the possibility of “capture” by               
interest groups other than the regulated firms. Furthermore, exceptions to the general rule that              
regulatory agencies are captured by the regulated firms are explained by references to the              
personality of the legislators, public opinion, ignorance, folk wisdom etc.   10
 
Posner also provides criticisms of both the traditional public interest theory of regulation and “the newer                
economic theory” which regards regulation as “a service supplied to effective political interest groups.”  11
 
Which leads us back to the question of why firms might want to allocate “property rights in valuable                  
information” to managers, rather than to shareholders. 
 
The independence of the regulator from the industry which is being regulated is vital to ensuring that                 
regulatory capture does not occur. Regulatory capture is less likely to occur where more actors are                
involved in the regulatory process and is more likely to occur where there is regular contact between the                  
regulator and the regulated (firms). Whilst these actors may have their interests, and whilst despite such                
interests, it may be optimal allocating these resources to certain agents, the intervention of courts serves                
in many respects as a check in dealing with the available resources - in such a way whereby a greater                    
level of maximisation of utilities is achieved. 
 
 
Flexibility is also certainly a crucial and vital element in all evolutionary processes, and has been a                 
feature of common law - within the context of judicial precedents - particularly when contrasted with the                 
principle of stare decisis. 
 
As highlighted by Zywicki and Sanders: 
 
9  See R Posner “Theories of Economic Regulation” (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science at 
pages 335-358 
10 See ibid at pages 343 and 344.  
 
11    Ibid at page 356 
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“Preservation of legitimate expectations often will be best furthered, not by adherence to precedence,              
but by a prudent and thoughtful updating of rules to adapt to changing needs and expectations. In                 
particular, because legal rules are just one element of the set of rules and practices that guide individual                  
behavior in society, changes in non-legal rules may also affect legal rules such that in order to best                  
preserve expectations and predictability about others’ actions, it will become necessary to amend some              
legal rules to better cohere with changing legal and non-legal rules. The objective is to increase social                 
coordination such that individuals will have maximum freedom to act on local information as it arises.                
Interpersonal coordination, not aggregate economic efficiency, should be the overarching goal of the             
legal system.”  12
 
Hence the need for a reasonable balance between certainty and flexibility in the judicial process is also                 
evident. To what extent should certainty and rigidity in the process be sustained in order to preserve the                  
legitimate expectations of those parties involved? Moreover, it is also reflected that “the thoughtful              
updating of rules” as a means of adapting to changing needs and expectations is necessary in the goals                  
of preserving legitimate expectations. 
 
The aim of the ensuing section is to highlight the importance of the purposive application of rules in the                   
“updating” process. Such a goal will be facilitated by way of reference to the rules of statutory                 
interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
B “The Thoughtful Updating of Rules”: Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
 
The purposive intent of rules and the legislator constitutes a fundamental characteristic of the common               
law system. In illustrating the increased role of judges, by not only adhering to the legislator or                 
legislation, and the growing importance of interpreting rules with intent, the application of rules of               
statutory interpretation and the evolution of such rules will be elaborated on: 
 
 
The Literal Rule of Statutory Interpretation 
 
This usually constitutes the basic, starting point in construing a piece of legislation. Under this rule,                
judges are required to interpret statutes and legislation according to their ordinary, natural and dictionary               
meaning even if the outcome of such an interpretation may generate absurd or ridiculous results. Judges’                
roles are considerably limited and restricted under this rule and may be regarded as being more passive                 
12   TJ Zywicki and AB Sanders, “Posner, Hayek & the Economic Analysis of Law” Iowa Law Review Volume 93 No 
2,pp 559-603 February 2008 at page 577 
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when compared to their roles under the other methods of statutory interpretation. Whilst certainty              
appears to be an advantage of complying with this rule, such advantageous attributes must be weighed                
against the results which are obtained where absurd outcomes are generated and the legitimate              
expectations of parties involved are effectively not met.  
 
 
For this purpose, the golden rule constitutes the next resort where absurd results need to be mitigated. 
 
 
 
The Golden Rule of Statutory Interpretation 
 
Under this rule, judges are not only required to give effect to the literal meaning and application of the                   
rule, but should also do so with the aim and purpose of avoiding an absurd result. The golden rule is                    
namely, thus: 
 
“The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary                 
meaning.” 
 
- Viscount Simon (Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries)  13
 
 
 
The Mischief Rule of Statutory Interpretation 
 
The mischief rule represents a much narrower application of the golden rule - narrower in the sense of                  
its greater focus on the intent of the legislator. Its application is considered necessary where a statute is                  
considered to have been introduced as a means of remedying or rectifying a defect or problem (the                 
mischief) in the common law.  
 
An extension of the application of the mischief rule is embodied in the fourth and final rule of statutory                   
interpretation being considered under this heading: namely, the purposive rule or the Rule in Heydon’s               
Case. 
 
 
 
 
13  [1940] A.C 1014 at page 1022 
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The Purposive Rule or The Rule in Heydon’s Case 
 
The purposive rule or the rule in Heydon’s case, has at its core purpose, the discovery of the intent of                    
Parliament or the legislator, namely, 
 
What purpose was the statute enacted to rectify - for which the common law had a defect or needed to                    
be rectified? 
 
 
From the above-mentioned rules an evolvement of the role of judges is demonstrated - both in respect                 
of a greater role given to judges to interpret according to the intent of the legislator, and also in respect                    
of analytic reasoning and balancing. 
 
It is quite understandable as regards why Hayek and Posner’s backgrounds have considerably             
impacted their perspectives of the role of judges.  
 
 
According to Zywicki and Sanders,  14
 
“Posner conceives law to be a series of disparate rules and as purposive. He believes that a judge                  
should examine an individual rule and come to a conclusion about whether the rule is the most efficient                  
available,” whilst Hayek is considered to “conceive law as a purpose independent set of legal rules                
bound within a large social order.” 
 
 
These views will now be examined to a broader context under a landmark ruling which has not only                  
contributed to judges’ abilities to introduce aids as a means of interpreting statutes to a more effective                 
extent, but also demonstrates the interdependency of rules - from one social order to the next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14  TJ Zywicki and AB Sanders, “Posner, Hayek & the Economic Analysis of Law” Iowa Law Review Volume 93 No 2, 
page 559 
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C Pepper v Hart : The Mischief Rule and the Inclusion of Aids (Parliamentary Privileged              
Information) as a Means to Statutory Interpretation 
 
 
Pepper v Hart represented a landmark ruling in the sense that it was the first time whereby the use of                    15
privileged parliamentary debates, information and records (Hansard) were permitted as admissible aids            
to statutory interpretation. The case involved the valuation of employee benefits for income tax purposes               
- given the ambiguous wordings of the statute involved. 
  
The following issues were raised in the case: 
 
1) Should existing rule prohibiting any reference to Parliamentary material (Hansard) in construing            
legislation be relaxed, and if so, to what extent? 
 
2) If so, does the case fall within the category of cases where reference to Parliamentary               
proceedings should be permitted? 
 
3) If reference to Parliamentary proceedings is permissible, what is the true construction of the              
statutory provisions? 
 
4) If reference to Parliamentary proceedings is not permissible, what is the true construction of the               
statutory provisions? 
 
As per Lord Browne-Wilkinson: 
 
“Reference to Parliamentary material should be permitted as an aid to the construction of legislation               
which is ambiguous or obscure, or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such cases,                   
references in court to Parliamentary material should only be permitted where such material clearly              
discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words.”               
 16
 
 
Section 63 of the 1976 Finance Act constituted the central piece of legislation in the case. It is obvious                   
that in such cases - not just those cases involving contentious attributions to the construction of the piece                  
of legislation, but those whose scope may lie beyond the scope and principal expertise of the judge, aids                  
15 [1992] 3 WLR 1032, [1993] 1 All ER 42, HL (E) 
16 See ibid, also see S C Styles, “The Rule of Parliament: Statutory Interpretation After Pepper v Hart”  Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies Vol 14 No 1 ( Spring 1994) pp 151-158 Oxford University Press 
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to statutory interpretation may be justified where such aids are vital to efficient allocation of resources,                
as well as generating outcomes which could be considered to be reasonably efficient within the ambit of                 
legitimate expectations of the parties involved. 
 
Should judicial decisions be criticised for generating more efficient and purposive outcomes -             
particularly where the legislative source being referred to (regardless of whether such a source is               
privileged information), has not been altered in any sense, but has simply served as a means of shedding                  
more light, providing more information, and giving purpose and meaning (or more meaning) to the               
legislation at hand? 
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D `Conclusion 
 
“If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in                   
the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must                 
be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant                 
changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. 
 
We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of the particular               
circumstances of time and place will be promptly used.”   17
 
In very interesting fashion, decentralization is also essential towards ensuring that possibilities for             
regulatory capture are minimised. 
 
Why firms might want to allocate “property rights in valuable information” to managers, rather than to                
shareholders? Because centralisation of information in the ambit of those better equipped and             
specialised to handle such information warrants such a move. 
 
Centralisation and decentralisation should thus be viewed from relative (as opposed to absolute)             
perspectives. Support for centralisation of information is justified where such information resides within             
capable and more equipped ambits who will transform such information for the purposes of              
maximisation of wealth or utilities. Given such merits, there still exists the need for checks and balances                 
to ensure that such powers are not abused. In like manner, decentralisation of information may still be                 
facilitated optimally taking into account timing, manner of the dissipation, and agents involved in the               
distribution of such information. 
 
Judges should certainly not make and unmake the law in certain cases - the supremacy of Parliament                 
should be adhered to. Judge made law, namely common law, however constitutes an exception where               
the principle of stare decisis cannot hold in a world which is constantly changing and where those                 
changes need to be incorporated into decisions if such decisions are to generate meaningful results. 
 
Prices, for example, constitute examples of vital information which need to be updated constantly if               
wages which were earned centuries ago, are to have meaningful and reasonable importance and values               
in modern day valuation and measurements. The rise of macroeconomics has certainly played a part in                
impacting and interpreting the values attributed to information and macro indicators. Markets will             
definitely evolve and adequate rules are needed to regulate the markets. This is very evident given the                 
17 F A Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society” The American Economic Review, Vol. 35, No. 4. (Sep., 1945), pp. 
519-530 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1809376?uid=3739920&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104299293711 
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fact that market failures, namely information asymmetries exist, and also the fact that the Efficient               
Markets Hypothesis does not hold in its entirety. Decentralization, hence constitutes a means of not only                
mitigating information asymmetries, but also ensuring that efficient maximisation of resource utilisation            
and allocation, takes place. 
 
Hence the decentralisation of powers and information, in this case, from the executive and legislature to                
the judiciary, should be viewed positively as a means of addressing and mitigating informational              
asymmetries resulting from ambiguous, confusing and misleading words within a statute and also             
resulting in more efficient allocation of resources, and awarding of damages to the parties involved. 
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